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34 To Arg. I. As for the first reason, based on Damascene's statement that the knowledge of God is implanted in all, I say that
in the same place he says that "no one knows God except by revelation" so that it is necessary to gloss his statement.
Therefore it can be said that the cognition of God is implanted in everybody, not in particular but in universal terms and
according to common notions which are most appropriately applied to God, and therefore by way of appropriation it is said
that the knowledge of him is implanted in all. Hence "being" and "act", etc. are most appropriately applied to God. Or one
could say that the knowledge of God is implanted in everyone by reason of their knowledge of creatures, from which they
come to know God. But even for him the knowledge of God is not self-evident.
35 To Arg. II. As for the other, where it is argued that according to Anselm the existence of a thing is self-evident, if it is
impossible to think of anything greater, I reply that such is not the case. Hence Anselm's intention there is not to show that
the existence of God is self-evident, but that it is true. And he makes two syllogisms, of which the first is: "Something is
greater than anything which does not exist; but nothing is greater than the highest; therefore the highest is not non-being."
There is another syllogism: "What is not a non-being, exists; but the highest is not a non-being, therefore the highest exists."
36 To Arg. III. As for the other reason, where it is claimed: "That truth exists is self-evident", I say for one thing the argument
fallaciously affirms the consequent, since it proceeds from truth in general to this "Truth" which is God. For another, I say
that it is not self-evident that "truth exists." And when it is argued that "If truth does not exist, it is true that truth does not
exist," I say that the consequence does not follow, because there is no truth except fundamentally in things and formally in the
intellect. But if nothing is true, then nothing exists and consequently in nothing is there truth. Hence, it doesn't follow that if
truth does not exist, therefore this dictum "Truth does not exist" is true.
37 To Arg. IV. As for the next argument, when it is claimed that the proposition "God exists" has terms which are purely
necessary, whereas this is not the case with "Every whole is greater than a part thereof" I say that the necessity of the
proposition is not a necessity characteristic of real things, but it consists of the evidence for the proposition which is in the
mind because the terms are there. "God exists," however, has a necessity and an evidence that stems from reality, but the other
proposition has the greater evidence in the mind, once its terms are known, and consequently it is self-evident, whereas the
other is not.
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